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INTRODUCTIONALTHOUGH 2009 was a legislative year, no significant legislative
changes were made to the Uniform Commercial Code (the
Code). However, several cases of interest were reported during




In Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., the Texas Supreme
Court held that the Code definition of "conspicuous" should be applied
* Professor of Law and Foundation Professor of Commercial Law, Texas Tech Uni-
versity. B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M. Harvard University.
1. The Texas version of the Uniform Commercial Code is contained in the first
eleven chapters of the Texas Business and Commerce Code (the Code). See TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. §H 1.101-11.108 (Vernon 2009).
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to any case in which the conspicuousness of a contract term was at issue-
whether or not the case arose under one of the chapters in the Code.2 In
an interesting pair of cases, the courts cited Dresser in applying the defini-
tion of "conspicuous" to determine whether the contracts in question
complied with the fair notice requirements of Texas law governing indem-
nity provisions. In Enron Corp. Savings Plan v. Hewitt Associates,
L.L.C.,3 the administrator of an employer's employee benefit plans
sought indemnification from the employer arising from the administra-
tor's miscalculation of benefits under the plans. The federal district court
for the Southern District of Texas noted that Texas law requires that a
clause indemnifying a party against its own negligence must provide fair
notice and be conspicuous.4 The court further noted that determination
of conspicuousness is a matter of law for the court.5 Reviewing the clause
in question, the court found it was not conspicuous because the uniform-
ity of typeface, font size, and bold headings in the lengthy agreement
were not such that the indemnity provisions would be called to the atten-
tion of a reasonable person.6 A motion by the employer to dismiss the
administrator's indemnity claims was granted.7
II. SALE OF GOODS
A. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Although the Code was first adopted in Texas in 1965 and codified as
part of the Business and Commerce Code one year later, it was not until
2001 that a Texas court addressed the issue of whether distributorship
contracts were contracts for services or contracts for the sale of goods.8
In Continental Casing Corp. v. Siderca Corp.,9 the Houston Fourteenth
Court of Appeals noted that no Texas case had previously addressed this
issue, but, following the view of a majority of cases decided in other juris-
dictions, the court ruled that the predominant factor, or "essence," of a
distributorship contract is a sale of goods, subject to the Code statute of
2. 853 S.W.2d 505, 509-11 (Tex. 1993). In Dresser, the supreme court interpreted the
definition of "conspicuous" as it then appeared in Texas Business & Commerce Code. See
id. § 1.201(10) (Vernon 2009); see also id. § 1.201(b)(10) (Vernon 2009) (explained and
revised definition).
3. 611 F. Supp. 2d 654 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
4. Id. at 663.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 673.
7. Id. at 675. In contrast to Enron, the federal district court for the District of North
Dakota, applying Texas law, held in EOG Resources, Inc. v. Badlands Power Fuels, LLC,
that an indemnity clause provided fair notice and was conspicuous where the clause fol-
lowed two paragraphs set out in capitals which were themselves part of a section that dealt
solely with indemnity. 621 F. Supp. 2d 731, 739 (D.N.D. 2009). The court reached this
conclusion even though the paragraph in question was not set out in capitals or in a font of
a different size or color. Id.
8. The Uniform Commercial Code first became effective in Texas on June 30, 1966,
having been adopted in the Act of May 31, 1965, 59th Leg., R.S., ch. 721, 1957 Tex. Gen.
Laws 1, 1-316. In 1967 it became part of the Texas Business & Commerce Code. See Act
of May 29, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 785, §§ 1-6 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 2343-2782.
9. 38 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
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frauds.10 The Siderca court further held that because the distributorship
contract was not in writing and none of the exceptions to the writing re-
quirement were met, the alleged agreement was unenforceable as a mat-
ter of law." In East Hill Marine, Inc. v. Rinker Boat Co.,1 2 the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals, citing Siderca, reached a similar result.' 3 It is
now well-established that distributorship contracts are subject to the
Code statute of frauds, as illustrated by D & M Edwards, Inc. v. Bio-Cide
International, Inc.,14 in which the parties conceded that the Code governs
enforcement of distributorship contracts. Despite this agreement on the
application of the Code, however, the plaintiff still faced the difficulty of
producing a writing that met the requirements of the Code. The plaintiff
argued that during an exchange of emails, the parties had agreed on the
terms of an agreement for the distribution of a product used in meat
processing. The defendant moved to dismiss the claim on the ground that
the alleged agreement had never been reduced to writing. While the fed-
eral district court for the Northern District of Texas was willing to con-
sider the emails as a writing that might satisfy the statute of frauds, the
plaintiff hit a procedural stumbling block because it had not attached the
emails to its pleading. The court, therefore, denied the motion to dismiss
without prejudice but required the plaintiff to amend its petition to in-
clude the emails and allege facts to support its additional claim that the
defendant had breached a fiduciary duty by failing to put the agreement
into a formal writing.' 5
B. DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES
Chapter 2 of the Code includes provisions dealing with three different
warranties of quality: (1) express warranties created by affirmations of
fact, descriptions, or the display of samples or models; (2) implied war-
ranties of merchantability; and (3) implied warranties of fitness for a par-
ticular purpose created by operation of law.16 The disclaimer of an
express warranty is ineffective to the extent the disclaimer is inconsistent
with words or conduct creating the warranty.' 7 Disclaimers of implied
warranties must be conspicuous, and, in the case of the implied warranty
of merchantability, the disclaimer must mention merchantability specifi-
cally.' 8 Implied warranties can also be disclaimed by using terms such as
10. Id. at 787-88. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201 (Vernon 2009) (statute of
frauds governing the sale of goods).
11. 38 S.W.3d at 787-88.
12. 229 S.W.3d 813 (Tex. App--Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied).
13. Id. at 818.
14. No. 3:08-CV-0670-L, 2009 WL 102732, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2009).
15. Id. at *5.
16. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.313 (Vernon 2009) (express warranties); id.
§ 2.314 (warranty of merchantability); id. § 2.315 (warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose). An implied warranty of good title is also created by operation of law under the
Texas Business and Commerce Code, but this is not a warranty dealing with the quality of
the goods. See id. § 2-312 (Vernon 2009).
17. Id. § 2.316(a).
18. Id. § 2.316(b).
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"as is" or "with all faults."' 9 An effective disclaimer can be used not only
to exclude warranty claims brought under the Code, but to bar claims for
negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and claims brought under the Decep-
tive Trade Practice Act (DTPA) as well.20 This point is nicely illustrated
by the decision in Thermacor Process, L.P. v. BASF Corp.,21 where the
purchaser of spray foam sued the seller for negligent misrepresentation,
fraudulent inducement, and violations of the DTPA. The federal Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a disclaimer printed in capital letters
and contained in the seller's "terms and conditions" accompanying each
sales order of the product in question, as well as in sales orders for other
products sold to the buyer over a period of years, was effective to bar all
of the buyer's claims.22 Based on a long-standing relationship between
sophisticated parties who were aware of the terms and conditions, the
court found no reason why the "terms and conditions" should not be
given effect. 23
C. DEMANDS FOR ASSURANCE AND SUSPENSION OF PERFORMANCE
Under the general law of contracts, if one party to a contract has rea-
sonable doubts about whether the other party has been or will be per-
forming, the party with doubts runs the risk of itself breaching the
contract if it acts too soon in declaring the other party to be in breach. 24
This risk led the drafters of the Code to include the innovative concept of
allowing a party to demand a reasonable assurance of performance if
there are "reasonable grounds for insecurity" about the other party's will-
ingness to perform.25 Pending a response, the party requesting assurance
is entitled to suspend its own performance under the contract, thereby
ameliorating the difficulty of making what might be viewed in hindsight
as a precipitous decision that did not justify a suspension of perform-
19. Id. § 2.316(c). This section also provides that the implied warranties may be dis-
claimed when the buyer has examined the goods and should have discovered any defects or
when the course of dealing, course of performance, or usage of trade would exclude these
warranties. See id.
20. Claims for negligent misrepresentation and fraud are, of course, common law
claims. Deceptive Trade Practice Act claims arise under the Texas Business and Com-
merce Code. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41-.63 (Vernon 2002).
21. 567 F.3d 736 (5th Cir. 2009).
22. Id. at 743 (citing Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., 896 S.W.2d 156,
161 (Tex. 1995) (disclaimer effective to bar fraud and DTPA claims); Coastal Bank SSB v.
Chase Bank of Tex., N.A., 135 S.W.3d 840, 843-44 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004,
no pet.) (disclaimer effective to bar negligent misrepresentation claim)). As to the con-
spicuousness of the disclaimer, the court held that the use of bold, capital letters met the
requirements for conspicuousness stated in the Texas Business and Commerce Code. See
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(b)(10) (Vernon 2009).
23. 567 F.3d at 743.
24. The difficulty lies in determining if the other party has committed a "total breach"
justifying the non-breaching party in refusing to perform its own obligations under the
contract or whether the other party has committed only a "partial breach," which does not
allow the non-breaching party to refuse performance. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTs §H 242-43 (1981).
25. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.609(a) (Vernon 2009).
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ance. 26 The concept proved useful enough to be included in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts as a device applicable to contracts of all types
and not limited to the sale of goods. 27 An interesting variation on the
idea of demanding assurance of performance arose in Flint Hills Re-
sources LP v. JAG Energy Inc. ,28 in which a contract allowed a buyer of
natural gas condensate to request evidence of clear title for the conden-
sate from the seller. The contract also provided that a failure of the seller
to respond to such a request allowed the buyer to withhold payments and,
ultimately, to cancel the contract. When the buyer learned that some
Mexican oil companies were selling stolen condensate in the United
States, the buyer became concerned about potential criminal liability if it
purchased stolen condensate even though its seller was not identified as
one that might be engaged in such activity. To clarify its position, the
buyer asked the seller to provide evidence of title. Although the seller
initially promised to provide documents showing its right to sell the con-
densate, such documents were never provided, and the buyer cancelled
the contract. Based on the contract terms, the federal Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that it did not need to reach the issue of whether the
buyer's request and cancellation were commercially reasonable under the
Code, because the contract itself had the effect of granting the buyer
these rights if the seller failed to respond to a request for information.29
The district court had found the buyer's request for information and sus-
pension of performance to be commercially unreasonable under the Code
and had granted summary judgment for the seller. The Fifth Circuit,
however, ruled that the contract terms relieved the buyer from the need
to prove the commercial reasonableness of its actions. It reversed the
judgment in favor of the seller and rendered summary judgment for the
buyer.30 In effect, this ruling gives a contracting party a way to avoid
factual disputes about whether a demand for assurance and possible sus-
pension of performance or cancellation is reasonably justified by contrac-
tually expanding the party's rights beyond those provided by the Code.
D. ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
The title of section 2.709, "Action for the Price," sounds like it gives
the seller a universal remedy-if the buyer breaches, sue for the price.
Unfortunately, the title is misleading in its simplicity. Actions for the
price are, in fact, quite limited and available to the seller in only two
circumstances: (1) if the goods have been accepted or if conforming
26. See id.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 251 (1981). See generally R.J. Robert-
son, Jr., The Right to Demand Adequate Assurance of Due Performance: Uniform Commer-
cial Code Section 2-609 and Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 251, 38 DRAKE L.
REV. 305 (1988-89) (discussing the history and application of UCC § 2.609 and Restate-
ment § 251).
28. 559 F.3d 373 (5th Cir. 2009).




goods have been lost or damaged after the risk of loss has passed to the
buyer, and (2) if the goods in the seller's possession have been identified
in the contract and cannot be resold, or the circumstances indicate an
effort to resell them would be fruitless.31 In Nazareth International, Inc.
v. J. C. Penney Co.,32 a clothing supplier sold goods to a department store
chain under the chain's standard wholesale contract. The contract al-
lowed the chain to charge back costs incurred for inspection and distribu-
tion if the supplier failed to comply with the terms of the contract and to
deduct the charge-backs from the amounts owed to the supplier. As
events unfolded, the charge-backs reached a point where the supplier
owed more money to the chain for charge-backs than the chain owed to
the supplier for the goods. Following a demand by the supplier for pay-
ment and the refusal of the chain to do so, the supplier sued on various
theories, including an action for the price. The Dallas Court of Appeals
recognized that this was a proper case for such a claim, since goods had
been delivered to the buyer and payment had not been made, but the
court also found that section 2.717 of the Code allows a buyer to deduct
damages from the price for any breach resulting from a seller's breach.33
Based on the contract terms and the evidence produced at trial, the court
held that a jury could find an action for the price would not stand where
the right to charge-backs exceeded the amount demanded by the sup-
plier.34 The supplier's other claims for usury, fraud, and negligent mis-
representation were also without merit, because a jury could reasonably
decide that dealings between the parties showed that the supplier under-
stood the terms of the wholesale contract and was not misled by conver-
sations and correspondence about how charge-backs were determined.35
In Global Integrated Building Systems v. Target Logistics, LLC, 3 6 a
manufacturer of prefabricated buildings contracted with a buyer to manu-
facture forty-four housing units to be resold by the buyer to a university
for temporary student housing. After ten units had been delivered to the
university, they were found to be substantially defective, so the buyer
notified the manufacturer to cease production. Following discussions be-
tween the manufacturer, the buyer, and the university, production re-
sumed and twenty-eight additional units were delivered in installments.
The buyer declined to pay for the last four of these units because of costs
incurred by the buyer in correcting defects. The manufacturer delivered
the remaining six units to its secured creditor who resold them to a third
31. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.709 (Vernon 2009). Both situations are posited
on the theory that the seller has completed performance and the goods are out of the
seller's control or have such limited utility to any other buyer that the seller is effectively
"stuck" with them. If neither of these situations exist, and the buyer has breached the
contract before delivery, the more common remedies for a seller are to sue for damages
under section 2.708 or resell the goods under section 2.706. See id. §§ 2.706, 2.708.
32. 287 S.W.3d 452 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied).
33. Id. at 458.
34. Id. at 458-59.
35. Id. at 459-61.
36. No. H-06-2637, 2009 WL 259360 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2009).
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party. The manufacturer sued the buyer, the university, and others for
fraud and breach of contract.37 As part of its claim against the buyer, the
manufacturer sought recovery of consequential damages resulting from
future lost profits anticipated from contracts with third parties, start-up
costs incurred to manufacture the units, and damages suffered by the
manufacturer in lawsuits brought against it by its own suppliers. 38 The
federal district court for the Southern District of Texas correctly pointed
out that the Code "does not provide for the recovery of consequential
damages by a seller" and limits this remedy to buyers.39 As a result, the
buyer was entitled to summary judgment.40 The court also determined
that the manufacturer failed to show the necessary elements to support its
fraud claims, and summary judgment was granted to the buyer on these
claims as well.4 1 Other issues associated with the breach of contract
claims and counterclaims between the manufacturer, the buyer, and the
university were reserved for trial.42
Under section 2.305 of the Code, the parties can agree to an open-price
term allowing either party to set the price instead of providing for a con-
tractually fixed price.43 Such an arrangement is useful when a contract is
to extend over a period of time during which market prices are expected
to fluctuate. One obvious difficulty with such an arrangement, however,
is that the party with the right to set the price may abuse that right by
setting a price that is too high or too low. To avoid such abuse, the Code
specifies that the price be one that is set "in good faith."44 "Good faith"
is defined to mean "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards."45 In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Gill,46 the Texas Su-
preme Court considered whether an oil company had breached its duty of
good faith to its service station dealers. In Gill, the oil company had
failed to disclose that the prices it set for gasoline sold to the dealers from
time to time allowed for the company's recoupment of rebates to dealers
for keeping stations open for specified hours and for selling specified
amounts of gasoline. Determination of this issue was critical because the
suit was brought by a state-wide group of dealers seeking certification of
claims as a class action. The dealers specifically limited their claims to
breach of contract instead of alleging fraud because it was clear that fraud
would require individual proof of reliance on the oil company's represen-
tation, and the need for individual proof would preclude a class action.47
37. Id. at *3.
38. Id. at *10.
39. Id. (quoting Nobs Chem., U.S.A., Inc. v. Koppers Co., 616 F.2d 212, 216 (5th Cir.
1980)).
40. Id.
41. Id. at *9.
42. Id. at *11.
43. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.305(b) (Vernon 2009).
44. Id.
45. Id. § 1201(b)(20).
46. 299 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2009).
47. Id. at 127. This point had been established previously in Henry Schein, Inc. v.
Stromboe. 102 S.W.3d 675, 686 (Tex. 2002).
4312010]
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Referring to its earlier decision in Shell Oil Co. v. HRN, Inc.,48 the su-
preme court held that failure to disclose the recoupment of rebates as a
factor in setting prices did not violate the good-faith standard where the
dealers made no claim that anything in the contracts prohibited the seller
from considering rebate costs when setting a price and made no claim
that the prices were commercially unreasonable. 4 9 The case was re-
manded for reconsideration of whether the dealers' claims met the re-
quirements for class certification.50
In Dynegy Midstream Services, L.P. v. Apache Corp. ,' a producer of
natural gas sued the buyer for an alleged failure to pay for gas delivered
to the buyer at the buyer's processing plant. The issue centered on the
interpretation of a contract term requiring the buyer to pay the seller
based on a percentage of gas sold by the buyer to third parties. Under
the system used for delivery, the amount of gas was measured at the
seller's wellhead and at the "tailgate" located at the buyer's plant. The
delivered quantity was always less that the quantity produced at the well-
head because of leakage during pipeline transmission, use of some gas as
fuel to operate pumping through the pipeline, gas lost during repairs, and
the like. Both parties agreed that the buyer was not required to pay for
the amount of gas produced at the wellhead and that decreases in the
amount of gas delivered at the tailgate were at the seller's risk. They
disagreed, however, about whether the buyer was liable for "unac-
counted-for" gas as measured by the difference between the amount of
gas delivered at the tailgate and the amount of gas sold by the buyer to
third parties. The Texas Supreme Court held that the contract terms re-
quiring payment based on a percentage of the sales made by the buyer
unambiguously placed the risk of loss for unaccounted-for gas on the
48. 144 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. 2004). In HRN, the Texas Supreme Court held that the duty
of good faith was not violated when an oil company allegedly set prices with the intent to
force independent dealers out of business so they could be replaced with more profitable
company-owned stations. Id. at 430-31. In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned
that a good faith violation of section 2.305 would occur if a seller set discriminatory prices
allowing some dealers to purchase gasoline at a lower price while demanding that other
dealers pay a higher price, but not where the same price was charged to all dealers. Id. at
437-38.
49. Gill, 299 S.W.3d at 128. Citing HRN, the supreme court noted that comment 3 of
section 2.305 of the Business and Commerce Code describes the good faith standard as one
that creates a safe harbor for the party setting the price by allowing that party to use a
"posted price" as the price charged. Quoting from HRN, the court described the purpose
of comment 3 as a means
to minimize judicial intrusion into the setting of prices under open-price-term
contracts.. . . The drafters reasonably foresaw that almost any price could be
attacked unless it benefitted from a strong presumption. Thus, they adopted
a safe harbor, Comment 3's posted price presumption, to preserve the prac-
tice of using sellers' standard prices while seeking to avoid discriminatory
prices.
Id. at 127-28. The court also noted that the good faith requirement had to be measured
objectively rather than subjectively to avoid having a jury decide if a seller in every
§ 2.305(b) case had acted with an improper motive even if the price ultimately set fell
within the range of commercially reasonable prices. Id. at 128.
50. Id. at 129.
51. 294 S.W.3d 164 (Tex. 2009).
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seller rather than the buyer, even if the decrease in quantity occurred
after delivery at the buyer's tailgate. 52
E. REMEDIES AND EXCUSED PERFORMANCE
Virginia Power Energy Marketing, Inc. v. Apache Corp.53 addressed ap-
plication of the force majeure doctrine where the seller failed to deliver
gas because of interruptions caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
When the buyer discovered that gas it purchased in the spot market to
cover a shortfall in deliveries came from its seller, the buyer deducted its
alleged damages from the amount it paid to the seller for deliveries that
had been made under their contract, and the seller sued to recover the
amount deducted. 54 The trial court accepted the seller's force majeure
excuse and granted summary judgment in favor of the seller. The buyer
appealed on two grounds: first, that the seller was required to use reason-
able efforts to avoid the disruption of deliveries by making delivery at an
alternate delivery point; and second, that there was a genuine issue of
material fact about whether the seller had an adequate supply of gas to
meet the buyer's needs.
The Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals agreed with the seller on
the first issue.55 The purchase contract provided for delivery at two loca-
tions. Location 1 was damaged by the hurricanes. Location 2 was un-
damaged. Although the seller could have delivered at either location, the
court held that because the contract terms expressly required a specific
amount of gas to be delivered at a specific location, the force majeure
clause would be rendered meaningless if the seller had to deliver more
gas to the undamaged Location 2 than called for under the contract.56
Summary judgment in favor of the seller was affirmed on this issue.5 7
On the second issue, the court had a different view. At Location 2, the
seller was required to deliver a total of 1,550,000 dekatherms of gas to be
divided equally between five different buyers, including the defendant,
52. Id. at 169. The court noted there was no claim that the buyer had converted any
gas and sold it to third parties without accounting for it. There was simply no evidence
about why the amount of gas sold by the buyer was less than the amount delivered at the
tailgate. Id.
53. 297 S.W.3d 397 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).
54. One can understand that the buyer may have been more than a little irritated
when its seller, in effect, said, "I can't deliver gas to you under our contract because of
hurricanes, but I can sell the same gas in the spot market at a higher price-buy it there if
you want it." The right of a buyer to deduct damages from amounts owed to a seller is
provided in section 2.717. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.717 (Vernon 2009).
55. Apache Corp., 297 S.W.3d at 401.
56. Id. at 403-05. The court held that while the Code provides for substituted perform-
ance by use of an alternate delivery method or location in section 2.614, this provision is a
"gap-filler" that can be varied by agreement of the parties, and the parties had done just
that under the purchase contract. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.614 (Vernon
2009). There are numerous gap-filler provisions in Chapter 2 of the Code. See JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: PRACTITIONER TREA-
TISE SERIES 125-35 (4th ed. 1995). Section 2.614 is listed among them. See id. at 135 n.62.
57. Apache Corp., 297 S.W.3d at 409.
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equating to 310,000 dekatherms to each buyer.58 After the hurricanes,
the seller actually delivered more gas to Location 2 than called for by the
five contracts and did not divide the output equally among the buyers. In
fact, one buyer received more than three times the amount required
under its contract, leaving only 559,111 dekatherms to be divided among
the other four buyers. Because the seller was able to supply more than
enough gas to satisfy its contract requirements at Location 2, an issue of
material fact existed about why the additional gas was not used to reduce
the shortfall in deliveries to the defendant buyer caused by the damage at
Location 1 and why the gas was not divided equally among the buyers. 59
Summary judgment in favor of the seller was reversed on this issue, and
the case was remanded for reconsideration of whether the asserted force
majeure excused the seller from performing at Location 2.60
In Stewart & Stevenson, LLC v. Galveston Party Boats, Inc.,61 a buyer
purchased six marine engines from a seller. The sale was financed in part
by a state grant from the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
(TCEQ) through a program designed to encourage businesses to use low-
emission diesel engines. The contract between the buyer, the seller, and
the TCEQ made no mention of arbitration. The engines were delivered
in two lots: the first consisting of two engines and the second of four
engines. In each instance, invoices were sent after the engines had been
shipped.62 All of the invoices contained an arbitration provision.
The buyer began experiencing problems with the engines within a few
weeks after installation. The seller attempted to resolve the problems
under its warranty, but the attempts were unsuccessful. The buyer ulti-
mately sued on several grounds, including breach of warranty, fraud, and
violations of the DTPA. The seller's motion to compel arbitration was
denied by the trial court, and the seller appealed.63 As a threshold mat-
ter, the Houston First Court of Appeals found that the arbitration provi-
sion on the invoices, if effective, would require arbitration under the
Federal Arbitration Act.6 4 As to the effectiveness of the provision, how-
ever, the court reasoned that the provision never became part of the con-
tract between the parties, because (1) there was no reference to
58. Under the contract, a "dekatherm" was defined as one million British thermal
units. Id. at 400 n.2.
59. Id. at 408.
60. Id. at 409.
61. Nos. 01-09-00030-CV, 01-09-00111-CV, 2009 WL 3673823 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] Nov. 5, 2009, no pet.).
62. The opinion indicates that invoices were sent a few days after each lot was shipped,
followed by additional invoices dated approximately ten months after shipment and instal-
lation. See id. at *2-3.
63. The court noted that after September 1, 2009, the procedure to appeal an order
denying a motion to compel arbitration was by interlocutory appeal and not by the former
procedure of requesting a writ of mandamus. Because this appeal was filed before the
effective date of the change, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction over an interlocutory
appeal and reviewed the case on the seller's petition for a writ of mandamus. Id. at *6
nn.5-6.
64. Id. at *5; see 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
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arbitration in the original purchase contract, (2) there was no "meeting of
the minds" on the use of arbitration, (3) the contract had not been effec-
tively modified, (4) the buyer's acceptance and use of the goods was not
sufficient to show an agreement to arbitrate, and (5) the buyer had not
ratified the use of arbitration by any of its actions.65 The seller's petition
for a writ of mandamus was denied.66
The effectiveness of an arbitration provision was also addressed in Har-
ris v. Blockbuster, Inc.,67 which was set against a novel factual back-
ground that may become more common as technology progresses. In
Harris, a video provider operated a video rental service in association
with Facebook that allowed a customer to rent a movie online. The cus-
tomer's movie choices would then be disseminated by the seller to the
customer's friends through the customer's Facebook account. The plain-
tiff sued for an alleged violation of the federal Video Privacy Protection
Act, a statute that prohibits a video provider from disclosing information
about a customer without having the customer's informed, written con-
sent at the time of the disclosure. 68 The provider's website contained the
"Terms and Conditions" governing rentals, including an arbitration provi-
sion and a provision purporting to allow the provider sole discretion to
change the "Terms and Conditions" at any time. Any change was to be
effective immediately and the customer was charged with the responsibil-
ity to periodically review the "Terms and Conditions" and to quit using
the website if the customer did not agree to any changes. The customer's
agreement was signified by clicking a box to complete a so-called "click-
wrap" agreement. The customer argued that the ability of the provider to
make unilateral changes to the contract terms, including the arbitration
provision, made the agreement to arbitrate illusory and unconscionable.
In its discussion, the federal district court for the Northern District of
Texas reviewed the Fifth Circuit decision in Morrison v. Amway Corp.69
and found that it involved a very similar arbitration clause, which was
held illusory because the right to change the terms did not limit the effect
of such a change to subsequent dispute, but instead permitted change in
terms to apply to disputes that arose before the change was made. 70 Be-
65. Galveston Party Boats, Inc., 2009 WL 3678323, at *7-12. An important element in
the court's reasoning was that the original contract was silent on the subject of arbitration,
and the court was unwilling to hold that a "post-contract course of dealing ... served to put
[the buyer] on notice that its acceptance of and payment for goods ... would subject it to
mandatory arbitration in the event of a dispute." Id. at *11.
66. Id. at *13.
67. 622 F. Supp. 2d 396 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
68. See Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000). The Act allows recov-
ery of $2,500 in liquidated damages for each violation. Id.
69. 517 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2008).
70. Harris, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 398. Permitting one party to a contract to unilaterally
change the terms applying to disputes arising both before and after a change is not only
"changing the rules in the middle of the game," but also allowing a change in the rules to
reverse the result of rules used to make decisions earlier in the game. This is reminiscent
of the "Razoo Rule" noted by the court in Mauriceville Nat'l Bank v. Zerniel. 880 S.W.2d
282 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1995), rev'd per curiam, 892 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1995). As de-
scribed by the court, the Razoo Rule was one used in playing marbles "for keeps" and
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cause the video provider had unfettered discretion to change the arbitra-
tion terms, the court found the relevant clause, like the clause in
Morrison, to be illusory and unenforceable.7' Having found the arbitra-
tion provision illusory, the court held that it did not need to address the
issue of unconscionability. 72
Arbitration in In re Olshan Foundation Repair Co. 73 focused on the
issue of whether proceedings were to be conducted under the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) or under the Texas General Arbitration Act
(TGAA) when the owners of a home sued the seller for breach of con-
tract, breach of warranty, and violations of the DTPA for failing to make
foundation repairs. 74 The seller filed a plea in abatement, arguing that
the case was subject to arbitration under the FAA. The homeowners con-
tended that the TGAA governed their claims and, under that act, the
arbitration clause was void because their attorney did not sign the agree-
ment. After a hearing, the trial court denied the plea in abatement. The
seller sought a writ of mandamus to require arbitration under the FAA.
The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the contract made an effective
choice of Texas law and did not require language excluding application of
the federal law, noting that existing case law does not require "'magic'
language" to exclude the FAA.75 The judgment of the trial court was
"triggered an unwritten legal concept known as 'absolute and unquestioned ownership' of
all the marbles which could be grabbed by any of the players. The fairness of the 'Razoo
Rule' was derived from the fact that all players 'agreed' to the rule." Id. at 292.
71. Harris, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 398-99. The court also noted that the Fifth Circuit in
Morrison had distinguished In re Halliburton Co., in which the Texas Supreme Court had
approved a contract allowing a party to change an arbitration clause because any changes
would not be effective until ten days after notice was given to the other party and would
not apply to disputes arising before a change was made. Morrison, 517 F.3d at 254-47; see
In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 569-70 (Tex. 2002). This limitation on the ability to
unilaterally change the terms was viewed as a significant difference between the arbitration
provisions in Harris and Halliburton. See Harris, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 398-99.
72. Id. at 397.
73. 277 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. App.-Dallas, pet. denied).
74. Id. at 127. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1999); Texas General
Arbitration Act, TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 171.001 -.098 (Vernon 2005 &
Supp. 2009); Texas Home Solicitation Act, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 39.001-.009
(Vernon 2009). A violation of the Texas Home Solicitation Act is also a violation of the
DTPA. See id. § 39.008(e).
75. In re Oishan, 277 S.W.3d at 131. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted an
apparent disparity between two Fifth Circuit cases on the wording that must be used to
effectively choose the TGAA as the governing law. In Ford v. NYLCare Health Plans of
the Gulf Coast, Inc., the court upheld a clause that chose the TGAA as the governing law,
but contained no language excluding application of the FAA. 141 F.3d 243 (5th Cir. 1998).
In Pedcor Mgmt. Co., Inc. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Tex., Inc., the court held
that application of the FAA must be expressly excluded, basing its decision on In re L & L
Kempwood Assoc. Pedcor Mgmt. Co., Inc. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Tex.,
Inc., 343 F.3d 355, 361 (5th Cir. 2003); see In re L & L Kempwood Assocs., 9 S.W.3d 125,
127-28, 127 n.15 (Tex. 1999). The Dallas Court of Appeals in Olshan reasoned that the
language used in the arbitration clause was adequate to meet the Kempwood test without
having to use any particular phrase such as, "Arbitration under this contract is governed by
the Texas General Arbitration Act and application of the Federal Arbitration Act is ex-
cluded." See 277 S.W.3d at 132. Nonetheless, careful drafting would indicate that language
excluding application of the FAA might avoid disputes of the kind illustrated by Olshan.
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upheld and the mandamus petition was denied.76
In a pair of cases reported during this Survey period, the Texas Su-
preme Court addressed the right of parties to recover attorney's fees in
breach of contract cases. In MBM Financial Corp. v. Woodlands Operat-
ing Co., L.P.,77 an equipment lessee had rented nineteen copiers under a
four-year lease. When the lessee decided not to renew the lease, the les-
sor engaged in a series of maneuvers to prevent the lessee from terminat-
ing the lease so the lessor could collect rent for an additional year. The
lessor's stalling tactics included withholding information, changing re-
newal dates in the leases, and refusing to designate a location for return
of the copiers. Because of the delay, the lessee sought recovery for time
wasted in seeking the lessor's cooperation and for legal costs incurred in
the process. At trial, however, the lessee introduced no evidence placing
a value on the lost time, but the trial court entered judgment in favor of
the lessee for nominal damages of $1,000 plus attorney's fees of
$145,091.59.78 The Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed the award of
nominal damages but remanded the case for recalculation of the attor-
ney's fees.79 On further appeal, in a copiously footnoted opinion detail-
ing the history of nominal damages in Texas and elsewhere, the Texas
Supreme Court ruled that an award of $1,000 was not nominal, and given
the failure of the lessee to produce any evidence about the value of the
time lost in dealing with the lessor, the award had to be reversed.80 The
supreme court then turned to the issue of whether attorney's fees were
recoverable absent proof of damage. On this issue, the supreme court
held that proof of some damage was required and that attorney's fees
could not be recovered on the basis of the lessor's bad-faith pre-litigation
conduct or by recasting the lessee's claim as one for declaratory relief for
the sole purpose of recovering attorney's fees.8 '
76. Id. As of September 1, 2009, the proper procedure to challenge denial of a motion
to compel arbitration is by interlocutory appeal. See supra note 63. As to the grounds for
an appeal from an adverse arbitration decision, see infra note 124.
77. 292 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2009).
78. Id. at 663.
79. MBM Fin. Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., 251 S.W.3d 174, 184 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 2008), rev'd, 292 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2009).
80. MBM Fin. Corp., 292 S.W.3d at 666. The court noted it had previously held that a
case would not be reversed and remanded simply to allow a party to recover nominal
damages. Id. (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Employers Cas. Co., 380 S.W.2d 610, 614-15 (Tex.
1964)). Because the lessee's damage recovery was $0.00, the court held that it was not
necessary to reach the question of whether nominal damages alone would support the
award of attorney's fees. Id.
81. Id. at 670. The court reasoned that recovery of attorney's fees based on pre-litiga-
tion bad faith was not allowed by rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure because
such recovery is posited on post-litigation conduct. Id. at 667. As to an award of attorney's
fees under section 37.004(b) of the Texas Declaratory Judgments Act, allowing recovery of
attorney's fees in the context of this case would frustrate the limits on fee recovery pro-
vided in section 38.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code by permitting a
declaratory judgment claim to be "merely tacked onto a standard suit based on a matured




In the second case, Intercontinental Group Partnership v. KB Home
Lone Star L.P., decided on the same day as MBM Financial, the Texas
Supreme Court held in a five-to-four decision that a contract clause al-
lowing recovery by the "prevailing party" in litigation was also ineffective
to permit recovery of attorney's fees.82 The supreme court reached this
result by reasoning that, absent a definition of the term in the contract, a
"prevailing party" must recover something in the lawsuit. In this case,
the jury found the defendant had breached the contract but found $0.00
damages.83 Because the contract did not address whether there would be
a "prevailing party" in the event of a breach without damages, the lower
court's award of attorney fees was reversed and judgment rendered in
favor of the defendant. 84 Four justices joined in a vigorous dissent writ-
ten by Justice Brister, who had written the majority opinion in MBM Fi-
nancial. The dissent reasoned that the contract terms made it clear that
the "prevailing party" could be either the plaintiff or the defendant. In
the view of the dissent, the critical language in the contract was that it
allowed the recovery of fees by either party who prevailed "in an action
'to declare rights hereunder." 85 Because the plaintiff obtained a jury de-
termination that the defendant had breached the contract, this made the
plaintiff the "prevailing party."86
These two cases present an interesting study of legal reasoning applied
to the interpretation of statutes and contracts. They are well worth read-
ing, not only for their substantive discussions, but for the light they cast
on the importance of contract drafting and on the judicial process.
III. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
A. LIABILITY OF PARTIES
Chapter 3 of the Code contains an elaborate series of provisions detail-
ing the liability of parties on negotiable instruments.87 While most of
82. 295 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Tex. 2009).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 653, 662.
85. Id. at 662.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.412 (Vernon 2002) (Obligation of
Issuer of Note or Cashier's Check); id. § 3.413 (Obligation of Acceptor); id. § 3.414 (Obli-
gation of Drawer); id. § 3.415 (Obligation of Indorser). The official text of UCC Article 3
was substantially revised in 1990, and this revision was adopted in Texas in 1995. See Act
of May 29, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 921, §§ 1-2, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 4582 (codified at
TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ch. 3). Prior to the revision, the parallel sections in the earlier
Article 3 were titled in the form, "Contract of Maker, Drawer, and Acceptor," "Contract of
Indorser," etc. See Peter A. Alces, An Essay on Independence, Interdependence, and the
Suretyship Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 479 n.120 (1993) (emphasis added). The
titles were changed by the revision, but there is no discussion of the reason for this change
in the transcript of the meetings of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) or in the transcript of the proceedings of the American Law Insti-
tute (ALI) that preceded final approval of the revision. See HANDBOOK OF THE NCCUSL
AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS NINETY-SEVENTH
YEAR 313-19 (1988) [hereinafter NCCUSL]; PROCEEDINGS OF THE 67m ANNUAL MEET-
ING OF THE A.L.I. 382, 405 (1990) (transcribing Robert L. Jordan). The only references
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these provisions apply to issuers and transferors, a few deal with the lia-
bility of transferees.88 In Woods Code 3, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., 89 a dishonest bookkeeper with authority to write checks on her em-
ployer's account embezzled funds by writing several hundred checks on
the account, making them payable to herself or fictitious entities, and de-
positing them in her personal account. The employer sued the bank
under section 3.307 of the Code, alleging the bank had notice that the
employee was breaching her fiduciary duties to her employer.90 The trial
court entered a take-nothing summary judgment in favor of the bank. On
appeal, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that indorsements on some
of the checks did not give the bank notice of a breach of fiduciary duty
because the payee names shown on the checks did not indicate they were
payable to the employer or to the employee as a fiduciary.91 Further-
more, for checks deposited without indorsement by the employee, the
court pointed out that section 4.205 of the Code allows a bank to take
unindorsed checks for collection.92 The court affirmed summary judg-
about changes in terminology appear in the introductory remarks in the NCCUSL Confer-
ence Proceedings referring to the revision as a "change in structure," "a more modern
structure," and the statement at the ALI proceedings: "The language might be somewhat
different, but the substance is the same." NCCUSL, supra; PROCEEDINGS OF THE 67TH
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE A.L.I., supra (transcribing Robert L. Jordan). The failure of
the court to recognize that the change in wording from "Contract" to "Obligation" had no
substantive significance seems to have led to an erroneous decision in Time Out Grocery v.
Vanguard Group., Inc., in which the court denied recovery of attorney's fees in an action
against the drawer of a check on the ground that the drawer's liability was based on a
statutory obligation rather than a contractual obligation. 187 S.W.3d 41 (Tex. App.-Dal-
las 2005, no pet.); see also John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 59 SMU L. REv. 1013,
1030-31 (2006) (discussing Time Out Grocery). Unfortunately, this error now seems to
have been perpetuated by the decision in Zamora v. The Money Box, in which the court,
relying on Time Out Grocery, denied recovery of attorney's fees in an action brought
against the drawer of a check without recognizing the change in section titles was appar-
ently regarded as a mere change in terminology and not a change in substance. No. 04-08-
00549-CV, 2009 WL 2050207, at *4 (Tex. App.-San Antonio July 15, 2009, pet. denied).
A petition for rehearing on the denial of the appeal in Zamora has been filed and one
hopes that, if the case ultimately results in a decision by the Texas Supreme Court, it will
recognize that claims against drawers, makers, acceptors, and indorsers are based on con-
tract and not on a statutorily created obligation. It is worth noting that the only two law
review articles directly addressing the liability of drawers under the revision both refer to
such liability as contractual. See Henry J. Bailey, New 1990 Uniform Commercial Code:
Article 3, Negotiable Instruments, Article 4, Bank Deposits and Collections 29 WIL-
LIAMETTE L. REv. 409, 419 (1993); Donald W. Garland, A New Law of Negotiable Instru-
ments: Revised Article 3 of the UCC 109 BANKING L.J. 557 (1992).
88. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.404 (Imposters; Fictitious Payees)
(Vernon 2002); id. § 3.405 (Employer's Responsibility for Fraudulent Indorsement by Em-
ployee); id. § 3.406 (Negligence Contributing to Forged Signature or Alteration of Instru-
ment). In each of these sections, the loss may be allocated between the transferor and the
transferee if the transferee fails to exercise ordinary care in taking or paying an instrument.
See id. §§ 3.404-.406.
89. 292 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2009, no pet.).
90. Id. at 796 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.307 (Vernon 2002)). If a
transferee has notice that an instrument is being transferred in breach of a fiduciary duty,
the transferee is subject to claims by the rightful owner of the instrument under section
3.306. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.306.
91. Woods Code 3, Inc., 292 S.W.3d at 798.
92. Id. at 797.
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ment in favor of the bank.93
A negotiable instrument under Chapter 3 is subject to acceleration at
the option of the holder if the note so provides.94 An important adden-
dum to the right of acceleration under Texas case law is the requirement
that the holder first give notice of intent to accelerate before giving notice
of acceleration. 95 In Burns v. Stanton,96 one co-owner of a business
bought out the other co-owner in exchange for shares of stock in the com-
pany and a promissory note. The note included a clause allowing acceler-
ation upon any of several events of default, one of which was the transfer
of stock by the maker of the note. When the maker converted the com-
pany from a corporation to a partnership, his stock was transferred to the
partnership. The holder declared a default and gave notice that he in-
tended to use the enforcement actions permitted by the note. The Texar-
kana Court of Appeals held that an event of default had occurred within
the meaning of the note and that notice that the holder would use his
available enforcement actions was sufficient notice of intent to acceler-
ate.9 7 There was no requirement that the holder use the specific phrase
"intent to accelerate." 98
One of the difficulties that a holder can encounter in exercising a right
of acceleration is the risk of miscalculating the interest due. 99 A usury
violation resulting from miscalculation of interest can sometimes be
avoided by using a savings clause to disavow any intent to charge usuri-
ous interest and to allow the holder to correct any error in the amount
demanded.100 A savings clause will not be effective, however, if it is "di-
rectly contrary to the explicit terms of the contract" or if the creditor
makes no effort to use the savings clause to correct an erroneous calcula-
tion.101 In Kennon v. McGraw, a note contained a savings clause that
stated, "It is further expressly agreed that interest on this note will not be
charged in excess of the highest legal rate specified by the Laws of the
State of Texas and that future adjustments will be made to avoid the pay-
93. Id. at 798.
94. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ArN. § 3.108 (Vernon 2002).
95. See Ogden v. Gibraltar Say. Ass'n, 640 S.W.2d 232, 233-34 (Tex. 1982). The Texas
Supreme Court has held that rights to notice of intent to accelerate, notice of acceleration,
presentment, and notice of dishonor may be waived if the waiver specifically identifies the
rights being waived. See Shumway v. Horizon Credit Corp., 801 S.W.2d 890, 893 (Tex.
1991).
96. 286 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2009, pet. denied).
97. Id. at 661.
98. Id. at 661-62.
99. See generally Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Schuenemann, 668 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. 1984);
Pentico v. Mad-Wayler, Inc., 964 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. de-
nied); Oyster Creek Fin. Corp. v. Richwood Invs., II, Inc., 957 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1997, pet. denied).
100. This is the method the Texas Supreme Court very strongly suggested in Jim Walter
Homes. See Jim Walter Homes, 668 S.W.2d at 333 n.6.
101. See generally Armstrong v. Steppes Apartments, Ltd., 57 S.W.3d 37, 47 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied); First State Bank v. Dorst, 843 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1992, pet. denied).
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ment of interest in excess of such limits."10 2 When the maker of the note
defaulted, the holder accelerated the note and demanded payment of in-
terest on the entire unpaid balance. The holder was twice advised that
this method of calculation was incorrect and constituted a demand for
usurious interest. Despite such notice, the holder persisted in her de-
mand. The Eastland Court of Appeals held that under these circum-
stances, the savings clause did not immunize against a usury claim. 103 The
case was remanded for the trial court to determine the amount of the
usurious charge by calculating the amount of interest that could be legally
charged under the clause and comparing that amount to the amount de-
manded by the holder.1 0 4
The Code introduced some new rules in section 3.311 regarding accord
and satisfaction by use of "payment-in-full" checks.105 Under the general
law of contracts, if a creditor cashed a payment-in-full check tendered by
the debtor on an unliquidated or disputed claim, the creditor was deemed
to have agreed to a contract discharging the debtor from any further
claim.10 6 Under section 3.311, a creditor who inadvertently cashes a
check tendered in full satisfaction of an unliquidated or disputed claim
can avoid a discharge of the debtor by tendering a refund of the amount
of the check within ninety days after payment of the check.107 Alterna-
tively, an organizational creditor can notify persons with whom it deals
that payment-in-full checks should be sent to a designated office or per-
son to give the creditor an opportunity to avoid the unintentional cashing
of such checks.' 08 In Milton M. Cooke Co. v. First Bank & Trust,'09 a
company borrowed money from a bank. In an unrelated series of events,
the company's bookkeeper embezzled funds from the company to sup-
port her gambling habit. The bank refused to reimburse the company for
the amounts paid on unauthorized checks issued by the bookkeeper to
herself. In an attempt to recoup its losses, the company issued two checks
to the bank in the amount of its usual monthly payments, but added a
notation that the checks were "payment in full" for the loans.11 0 In an
action by the bank to collect on the notes, the company argued that it was
discharged from any further liability by an effective accord and satisfac-
tion under section 3.311. The Houston First Court of Appeals disagreed,
pointing out that the terms of the notes expressly required that any check
tendered as payment in full be sent to a specified office of the bank."'
102. 281 S.W.3d 648, 651 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2009, no pet.).
103. Id. at 652.
104. Id. at 653-54.
105. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.311 (Vernon 2002).
106. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 282 (1982); 6 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRAcrs H§ 1277-78 (1962).
107. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.311(c).
108. Id.
109. 290 S.W.3d 297 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
110. Id. at 301. The checks were written in the amounts of $3,471.38 and $2,888.91
against loans that then totaled $122,218.53 and $193.156.51, respectively. Id.
111. Id. at 305.
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Because an officer of the company had given the checks to a teller instead
of sending them to the designated office, the court held that no accord
and satisfaction had taken place.112 Summary judgment was affirmed in
favor of the bank.113
IV. BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS
A. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PAYOR BANKS AND THEIR CUSTOMERS
Although Chapter 4 of the Code contains numerous provisions outlin-
ing the rights and responsibilities of banks and their customers, many of
those provisions can be varied by agreement.114 Such agreements have
been subject to litigation in Texas during the Survey period."15
In In re Morgan Stanley & Co., the Texas Supreme Court addressed the
validity of arbitration clauses contained in brokerage account agreements
where the account holder allegedly lacked mental capacity to contract. 116
The supreme court held that determination of mental capacity was to be
determined by the court, not by the arbitrator." 7 The supreme court rea-
soned that issues of contract formation go to the very existence of a con-
tract and are not subject to the usual requirement that a challenge be
made separately and specifically to the arbitration clause itself.' 18 The
supreme court upheld the decision of the trial court denying a motion to
compel arbitration.119
An important issue regarding arbitration in the context of bank ac-
counts was addressed by the federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon.120 In Bacon, a customer submit-
ted a claim in arbitration against a bank for reimbursement of $238,000 in
112. Id. at 306.
113. Id. at 312.
114. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.103(a) (Vernon 2002).
115. See Gerry W. Beyer, Wills and Trusts, 63 SMU L. REV. 865, 885-87 (2010) (discuss-
ing Holmes v. Beatty, 290 S.W.3d 852, 854-59 (Tex. 2009); Nipp v. Broumley, 285 S.W.3d
552, 558-69 (Tex. App.-Waco 2009, no pet.)).
116. 293 S.W.3d 182, 183 (Tex. 2009).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 187-88. In its opinion, the court described Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna, as a case that created three categories of challenges to arbitration clauses: (1)
challenges to the validity of the contract generally, (2) challenges to the arbitration clause
specifically, and (3) challenges based on whether a contract ever came into existence. Id.
at 187; see Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 n.1 (2006). In the
view of the supreme court, challenges falling into the first two categories were to be deter-
mined by the arbitrator; challenges in the third category were to be determined by the
court. Id. at 188-89. In reaching its conclusion that an issue of contract formation arising
from an assertion of mental incapacity was a question for the court, the supreme court
asserted that it was not bound by a contrary result reached by the Fifth Circuit in Primerica
Life Insurance Co. v. Brown, because Texas state courts are bound only by decisions of
higher Texas state courts and by the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 189-90; see
Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 2002). The opinion in In re
Morgan Stanley includes citations to other cases and secondary sources that are critical of
the Primerica decision and are "must reads" for attorneys considering challenges to arbi-
tration clauses. In re Morgan Stanley, 293 S.W.3d at 188.
119. Id. at 190.
120. 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009).
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withdrawals made by her husband's forgery of checks drawn on her indi-
vidual retirement accounts. The customer notified the bank as soon as
she discovered the unauthorized withdrawals. The arbitration panel
awarded the customer $218,000 in damages and $38,000 in attorney's fees.
The bank requested vacatur of the award, and the district court granted
the motion to vacate, holding that the award was made in manifest disre-
gard of the law.121 The holding was based on three grounds: (1) the cus-
tomer was not harmed by the withdrawals because her husband used the
money for her benefit and promised to pay her back; (2) the customer's
claims were barred by Texas law, which required the customer to report
an unauthorized transaction within thirty days of the withdrawal; and (3)
Texas law required apportionment among the liable parties (in this case
the customer's husband). 122 On appeal, relying on the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L. C. v. Mattel, Inc.,123
the Fifth Circuit held that a manifest disregard of the law was not an
independent, non-statutory ground for vacating awards under the
FAA.124 The court concluded that section 10 of the FAA limits the
grounds for vacatur and modification of arbitration awards. 125 The court
held that under the FAA, statutory provisions are the exclusive grounds
for vacatur and any non-statutory claims must be rejected.126 The court
vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case.127 Similar
decisions on use of manifest disregard of the law as a basis for appealing
an arbitration award were reached by the Dallas Court of Appeals in
Ancor Holdings, LLC v. Peterson, Goldman & Villani, Inc.,128 and by the
Houston First Court of Appeals in Allstyle Coil Co. v. Carreon'29 and
Royce Homes, L.P. v. Bates.'30
Another issue that can arise between a customer and a payor financial
institution about the payment of unauthorized withdrawals is whether the
customer has complied with the time limits in UCC section 4-406 or any
modification of those time limits contained in a deposit agreement.' 3 ' In
In re Estate of Berry,132 several forged checks were charged by a bank
121. Bacon, 562 F.3d at 350.
122. Id. at 358.
123. 552 U.S. 576 (2008).




128. 294 S.W.3d 818, 828 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied).
129. 295 S.W.3d 42, 44 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
130. No. 01-08-00191-CV, 2010 WL 184216, at *11 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan.
21, 2010, no pet.).
131. Section 4.406 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code requires notice of forger-
ies of a customer's signature and notice of alterations to be given within a reasonable time
after bank statements are sent or made available to the customer. TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 4.406 (Vernon 2002). If repeated forgeries are made by the same wrongdoer,
the time period is specified as thirty days. Id. Whether or not repeated forgeries occur,
section 4.406 also provides an outside limit of one year for giving notice of forgeries or
alterations. Id.
132. 280 S.W.3d 478 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.).
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against a customer's account between February 14, 2003, and March 4,
2004. Statements of account were sent to the customer's address through-
out this period. In September 2005, the customer sued the bank to re-
cover the amounts paid on the forged checks. The Eastland Court of
Appeals held that, even if filing suit constituted notice to the bank, the
customer's action was barred by the one-year time limit for giving notice
of forgeries that is found in section 4.406(f).1 33
On occasion, a death occurs and the decedent's body is unclaimed. In
such a situation, an effort is made to find relatives of the decedent. In
larger counties, this job is often assigned to a county employee. Such was
the case in Bexar County, where a county clerk named Melvyn Spillman
had this responsibility for several years. Spillman discovered that with his
home computer and a county seal, it was a simple matter to create fake
letters of administration, name himself as administrator of decedents' es-
tates and present the documents to banks to give himself authority to
write checks and withdraw funds from their bank accounts. 134 When his
scheme was discovered, the inevitable legal tangle ensued surrounding
the liability of banks that paid checks on these accounts based on the
false letters of administration. In Lenk v. Guaranty Bank,135 a lawfully
appointed administrator sued a bank for breach of its deposit agreement
on behalf of one of the looted estates. Summary judgment was entered in
favor of the administrator on the ground that section 186 of the Texas
Probate Code did not allow a bank to rely on fraudulent letters of admin-
istration to avoid a breach of contract claim.136 Lenk v. Jefferson State
Bankl37 involves the same issue but, from a commercial law standpoint, is
a more interesting decision because it also addresses the application of
the notice requirement in section 4.406 of the Business and Commerce
Code. After reaching the same conclusion that the bank could not rely
on section 186 of the Probate Code as a defense to a breach of contract
claim, the San Antonio Court of Appeals also held that the notice re-
quirement in section 4.406 was not triggered because the bank had sent
account statements to an address provided by Spillman and not to the
customer.138 Because the statements were sent to Spillman instead of the
customer, the one-year bar in section 4.406(f) did not preclude the law-
fully appointed administrator from asserting a claim based on checks
133. Id. at 481; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.406(f).
134. Over the years, Spillman stole something in excess of four million dollars, and the
story made the national news. See David Kohn, Scammed: County Clerk Cashes In, CBS,
Nov. 8, 2002, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/11/07/48hours/
main528514.shtml. A more detailed account appears in ERIC COLE & SANDRA RING, IN-
SIDER THREAT: PROTECTING THE ENTERPRISE FROM SABOTAGE, SPYING, AND THEFr 128-
34 (Syngress Publishing 2006).
135. No. 04-07-00503-CV, 2008 WL 2602121 (Tex. App.-San Antonio July 2, 2008, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (rule 53.7(f) motion granted).
136. Id. at *1.
137. No. 04-07-00828-CV, 2009 WL 618693 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Mar. 11, 2009,
pet. granted) (mem. op.).
138. Id. at *3.
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drawn by Spillman and paid from the decedent's account.' 39
V. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. CREATING AND PERFECTING A SECURITY INTEREST
The basic rules for the creation of a security interest under Chapter 9
can be stated rather easily: (1) the debtor must agree to grant a security
interest in described collateral to the secured party, (2) the debtor must
have rights in the collateral, (3) value must be given by the secured party,
and (4) the agreement must satisfy the Chapter 9 "statute of frauds."140
Once these requirements have been met, the security interest is said to
"attach" to the collateral.141 Perfection of a security interest requires
compliance with any one of five methods described in Chapter 9, the
most common of which is the filing of a financing statement to give notice
to third parties that a party has a security interest in the described collat-
eral.142 One of the more common problems in the application of these
requirements is the failure of the parties to properly describe the collat-
eral in the security agreement or in the financing statement.143 This situa-
tion occurred in Sanders v. Comerica Bank, Inc.,144 in which both the
security agreement and the financing statement described the collateral
as stock in a corporation, but the secured party claimed a security interest
in construction equipment. The secured party argued that a subsequent
financing statement identified the collateral as construction equipment,
but the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held there was no security agree-
ment granting a security interest in equipment, and the financing state-
ment, standing alone, did not operate to create a security interest.145 The
secured party also argued that a competing secured lender knew of his
139. Id. The bank also argued that the claim was barred because the account agreement
shortened the time period from one year to sixty days. The court pointed out that the
contractual modification was irrelevant because it would only apply if section 4.406(a)
were satisfied by sending account statements to the customer. Id. at *4.
140. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.203(b) (Vernon 2002). These requirements
are often conflated as "Agreement, Value, Rights." See e.g., 4 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT
S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 31-2 (6th ed. 2010). In fact, section
9.203(b)(3) indirectly creates a statute of frauds requirement by specifying that any one of
three conditions be met to make a security agreement enforceable. Under this subsection,
there must be an authenticated security agreement (usually written and signed by the
debtor), or the secured party must have possession of the collateral, or the secured party
must have "control" of the collateral. Id.
141. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.203(a).
142. See id. § 9.310(a)-(b). The five perfection methods are: (1) filing a financing state-
ment, (2) taking possession of the collateral, (3) obtaining control of the collateral, (4)
automatic temporary perfection, and (5) automatic permanent perfection. See id.
143. Errors in description can occur in either the security agreement or in a financing
statement filed to perfect the security interest. See, e.g., Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v.
Omnibank, N.A., 858 S.W.2d 586, 591 (Tex. App.-Houston 114th Dist.] 1993, writ dism'd)
(overly broad description in security agreement ineffective to permit attachment); Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. J & L Gen. Contractors, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1992, no pet.) (financing statement referred to collateral on attached list, but no
list was attached).
144. 274 S.W.3d 861 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.).
145. Id. at 864.
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claim to the equipment, but the court correctly pointed out that knowl-
edge of a claim does not obviate a valid agreement creating a security
interest in the claimed collateral. 146
One of the most important differences between the pre-2002 Chapter 9
and the present Chapter 9 was a change in the location where financing
statements must be filed to perfect a security interest in collateral. Under
the former Chapter 9, filings were to be made in the state where the col-
lateral was located. 147 Under the current Chapter 9, filings must be made
in the state where the debtor is located. 148 Section 9.307 contains a series
of rules to determine the location of a debtor.149 For a corporate debtor
(a "registered organization" in the terminology of Chapter 9), the loca-
tion of the debtor is the state where the debtor's certificate of incorpora-
tion was issued.150 This change in the location for filing resulted in one of
the most significant cases decided during the Survey period.
In In re SemCrude, L.P.,151 a parent corporation and several affiliated
companies were engaged in the business of buying oil and gas from Texas
producers and then reselling it to refiners and other resellers. In 2008,
volatility in the oil and gas markets caused a loss to the companies in
excess of two billion dollars. This loss resulted in the filing of Chapter 11
bankruptcies by the parent company and its affiliates.
Under a non-uniform Texas provision added to the Business and Com-
merce Code as section 9.343, oil and gas producers have automatically
perfected security interests in oil and gas sold to a purchaser, in this case,
the companies engaged in buying and reselling the product. When the
Chapter 11 proceedings were filed, the Texas producers claimed per-
fected security interests in the product still in the debtors' hands and in
the proceeds the debtors had received but not yet paid to the Texas pro-
ducers. In a careful review of the non-uniform Texas provision and its
relationship to the requirement that perfection requires filing in the state
where the debtor is located, the bankruptcy court for the District of Dela-
ware concluded that the non-uniform provision applied only to product
and proceeds located in Texas; product and proceeds in the hands of the
debtors outside Texas required perfection by filing in the state of the
debtors' location, in this case, either Delaware, where the parent com-
pany was organized, or Oklahoma, where an affiliate was organized.152
Because the Texas producers had not filed in either Delaware or
146. Id.
147. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.103, 9.401 (Vernon 2002).
148. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.301 (Vernon 2002).
149. See id. § 9.307(a)-(k).
150. See id. § 9.307(e). The term "registered organization" is defined in section
9.201(b)(71) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. See id. § 9.201(b)(71).
151. 407 B.R. 112 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009). This case involved oil and gas producers in
Texas. Id. at 117. Companion cases involving oil and gas producers in Kansas and
Oklahoma raised similar issues. See In re SemCrude, L.P., 407 B.R. 82 (Bankr. D. Del.
2009) (Kansas producers); In re SemCrude, L.P., 407 B.R. 140 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009)
(Oklahoma producers).
152. In re SemCrude, 407 B.R. at 138.
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Oklahoma, their security interests were unperfected and subordinate to
security interests claimed by banks that had made loans to the parent and
its affiliates and had perfected those interests by filing in the correct
locations.' 53
In re SemCrude nicely illustrates the hazard of making non-uniform
amendments to the Code that may not have extra-territorial effect under
the choice of law rules in section 9.301 of revised Article 9.154
B. SCOPE OF A SECURITY INTEREST
One problematic issue about the scope of security interests noted in the
last two Surveys has been the effect of the "hanging paragraph" in section
1325(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.'55 The dispute has centered on whether
a buyer's negative equity in a trade-in vehicle that is paid off in the
course of financing the purchase of a new vehicle should be included
within the scope of a purchase money security interest (PMSI) granted to
the secured party as part of the transaction. Although early cases decided
in the lower courts were deeply split on this issue, recent cases reaching
the U.S. court of appeals are unanimous in holding that amounts loaned
to pay off negative equity should be included in a PMSI.1 5 6 This issue
now seems to be settled in favor of including negative equity loans as part
of the value secured by a PMSI.
153. Id. Similar results were reached in the companion cases. See In re SemCrude, 407
B.R. at 111 (Kansas producers); In re SemCrude, 407 B.R. at 158 (Oklahoma producers).
Because of the importance of these decisions, the court certified all three cases for direct
appeal to the Third Circuit, but as of this writing, there is no record of an appeal.
154. The official text of section 9.301(1) in revised Article 9 provides, "Except as other-
wise provided in this section, while a debtor is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that
jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority
of a security interest in collateral." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.301(1) (Vernon
2002). This was a significant change from the prior law, which required filing in the state
where the collateral was located rather than filing in the state where the debtor was located.
See U.C.C. § 9-103(1)(b) (1972). Another non-uniform amendment adopted in Texas that
may create a trap for the unwary is section 9.503(a)(4). TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.503(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2009). This amendment attempts to clarify the use of the cor-
rect name of an individual debtor on financing statements by providing that the use of the
name shown on a driver's license or state identification certificate issued by the state of the
debtor's residence will sufficiently provide the name of the debtor. See id. This provision
would be effective in Texas for Texas residents, but it is possible that another state may
have a different standard and that the name shown on a driver's license or identification
certificate may not be adequate under the filing-office search logic used in the other state.
155. See John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 62 SMU L. REV. 995, 1015-16, 1015
n.159 (2009) (hereinafter Krahmer 20091; John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 61
SMU L. REv. 657, 673-74 (2008). By one account, the hanging paragraph "has no alphanu-
meric designation and merely dangles at the end of [11 U.S.C.] § 1325(a). There is no way
to cite to this provision other than its proximity to other citable provisions." See Dianne C.
Kerns, Cram-a-lot: The Quest Continues, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 10, 10 (2005).
156. See In re Dale, 582 F.3d 568, 574 (5th Cir. 2009) (including negative equity, gap
insurance, and extended warranties within scope of a purchase money obligation); In re
Mierkowski, 580 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 2009) (same); In re Ford, 574 F.3d 1279, 1285 (10th
Cir. 2009) (same); In re Price, 562 F.3d 618, 625-28 (4th Cir. 2009) (same); In re Graupner,
537 F.3d 1295,1302 (11th Cir. 2008) (same); but see In re Penrod, 392 B.R. 835, 859 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2008) (stating that negative equity should not be treated as part of a PMSI).
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Another difficulty arising under the hanging paragraph is whether a
debtor can voluntarily surrender a vehicle in full satisfaction of a secured
debt in a Chapter 13 plan or whether surrender satisfies the debt only in
an amount equal to the value of the vehicle, allowing the secured party to
assert an unsecured deficiency claim for any remaining balance of the
debt. As in the "negative equity as part of PMSI" cases, the courts of
appeals have been unanimous in interpreting the hanging paragraph to
allow secured parties to seek deficiency claims despite contrary interpre-
tations by the lower courts.'57
The worst of the hanging paragraph problems may now be behind us,
but similar issues can arise under state law. In Bledsoe Dodge, L.L.C. v.
Kuberski,58 a car buyer contended that the inclusion of negative equity
as part of the cash price for a new vehicle violated the Texas Finance
Code. 159 The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the buyer failed to show
the seller would have offered the same vehicle to a cash buyer at a price
lower than the price charged to the buyer with the exclusion of the
amount required to pay off the negative equity.160 The buyer also argued
that the negative equity should have been treated as a finance charge.
The court disagreed, reasoning that the amount owed on the buyer's
trade-in was not an amount imposed by the creditor as a condition of the
seller's extension of credit but should be treated, instead, as part of the
purchase price. 161
A problem with continuing the perfection of a security interest follow-
ing its assignment from one secured party to another was noted in the
157. See In re Miller, 570 F.3d 633, 640 (5th Cir. 2009) (treating the balance of debt in
excess of value of vehicle as an unsecured deficiency claim in Chapter 13 plan); In re Bar-
rett, 543 F.3d 1239, 1247 (11th Cir. 2008) (same); Tidewater Fin. Co. v. Kenney, 531 F.3d
312, 319 (4th Cir. 2008) (same); In re Ballard, 526 F.3d 634, 641 (10th Cir. 2008) (same); In
re Long, 519 F.3d 288,291 (6th Cir. 2008) (same, but in divided opinion); Capital One Auto
Finance v. Osborn, 515 F.3d 817, 822-23 (8th Cir. 2008) (same); In re Wright, 492 F.3d 829,
832 (7th Cir. 2007). A similar issue is whether a Chapter 13 plan can be modified by
surrender of a vehicle after a plan has been confirmed. See In re Davis, 404 B.R. 183, 189
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009). In In re Davis, the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of
Texas recognized that a plan may be modified to permit surrender of a vehicle in full
satisfaction of the secured portion of a debt scheduled in the plan. Nonetheless, the court
declined to do so in this case because the vehicle had been seriously damaged in a wreck
and sat in a repair shop for two years before it was repossessed by the secured party. The
court determined that the voluntary repossession permitted reclassification of the unpaid
portion of the secured debt as unsecured, but that it would be inequitable to treat the
surrender as full satisfaction of the claim because of the damage to the vehicle. Thus, the
court allowed reclassification of the secured debt but included the amount of the un-
secured debt as part of the unsecured deficiency. Id. at 196.
158. 279 S.W.3d 839 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.).
159. Id. at 841-42; see also TEx. FIN. CODE ANN.§ 348.004(a) (Vernon 2006) (defining a
cash price as the "price at which the retail seller offers in the ordinary course of business to
sell for cash the goods or services that are subject to the transaction").
160. Kuberski, 279 S.W.3d at 843. The net listed cash price for the vehicle was
$27,350.92, and the evidence before the court did not reflect any offer by the seller to sell
the vehicle to a cash buyer for less than that amount. Id.
161. Id. at 843-44.
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2009 Survey. 1 6 2 In In re Clark Contracting Services, Inc.,163 the bank-
ruptcy court for the Western District of Texas held that continued perfec-
tion of a security interest requiring perfection by notation of a certificate
of title required an assignee to record its name on the assigned titles.164
The court reached this decision based on its reading of the Texas Certifi-
cate of Title Act.16 5 Because this result conflicted with section 9.514 of
the Code, which permits, but does not require, an assignee to continue
perfection by making a filing of record, the Certificate of Title Act was
amended during the 2009 legislative session to parallel the permissive
continuation approach allowed by the Code.166 The continuation rule ap-
plied in Clark is, therefore, no longer effective for security interests per-
fected by notation on certificates of title.
C. EFFECT OF TERMINATING A SECURITY INTEREST
Once a debt has been repaid in full, Chapter 9 imposes several duties
on a secured party, including filing a termination statement or releasing
162. See Krahmer 2009, supra note 155, at 1016-18.
163. 399 B.R. 789 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2008); see Krahmer 2009, supra note 155, at 1016-
17.
164. In re Clark, 399 B.R. at 804.
165. Id. at 805; see also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.311(b) (Vernon 2002) (pro-
viding that perfection of a security interest in titled collateral must be made in compliance
with the Certificate of Title Act). At the time In re Clark was decided, section 501.111 of
the Texas Transportation Code required notation on a certificate of title to perfect a secur-
ity interest in titled collateral. In re Clark, 399 B.R. at 794; see TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN.
§ 501.111 (Vernon 2007)).
166. See Act of June 19, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 814, §§ 4-5, 2009 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
2049 (Vernon 2009) (codified as amendments to TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 501.113-
.114). The same Act made similar changes in the certificate of title provisions governing
utility security interests, boats, and boat motors. See Act of June 19, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S.,
ch. 814, §§ 1-2, 2009 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2047 (Vernon 2009) (codified as amendments to
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 261.004, 261.012) (utility security interests); Act of June
19, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 814, § 3, 2009 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2047 (Vernon 2009) (codi-




control over collateral. 67 In In re Spillman Development Group, Ltd.,168
the bankruptcy court for the Western District of Texas addressed the
question of whether a credit-bid purchase of a bankruptcy debtor's assets
that fully satisfied a debt required the secured party to return collateral to
the debtor. The court had no difficulty in concluding that full payment
required the return of a certificate of deposit pledged as security for the
loan, and that full repayment also extinguished any liability on the part of
the debtor's guarantors. 169
167. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.208 (Vernon 2002) (imposing duty to
release control of deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, investment property, letter-of-
credit rights, and electronic documents within ten days after demand by the debtor); id.
§ 9.513(a) (imposing duty to file termination statement in consumer goods transactions
within thirty days whether or not there is a demand by the debtor); id. § 9.513(b) (imposing
duty to terminate filing in commercial transactions within twenty days following demand
by the debtor). See also id. § 9.208 cmt. 4 (noting that no statutory duty was deemed neces-
sary to require the return of collateral in the possession of a secured party upon repayment
because common law conversion remedies were adequate).
Although not involving Texas law, the decision in Regions Bank v. Britt deserves note in
the context of termination of a security interest. 642 F. Supp. 2d 584 (S.D. Miss. 2009). In
Britt, two bank customers sued a bank for failing to release a lien after a loan had been
paid. According to the bank, one of the customers had signed a promissory note and deed
of trust to secure the loan. The note and deed of trust contained arbitration provisions
stating that the parties agreed to arbitrate any disputes that arose between them. The bank
contended that the customers' claim fell within the arbitration provision and filed a motion
to compel arbitration. The customers objected to the bank's motion arguing that (1) the
court lacked personal jurisdiction over one of the customers because he was never served
with process; (2) the FAA did not apply because the transactions did not involve interstate
commerce; (3) the deed of trust was invalid because it encumbered marital property and
only one of the parties had signed it; and (4) the promissory note was unenforceable and
moot because it had been satisfied. Id. at 586-887, 591-92.
The federal district court for the Southern District of Mississippi held that the FAA
applied because the transaction did involve interstate commerce. Furthermore, the arbi-
tration agreement remained enforceable even though the note had been paid. The court
reasoned that the arbitration agreement did not stipulate that it would expire upon payoff
of the loan; therefore, the obligation to arbitrate survived by operation of law. Id. at 592.
Britt raises questions about the arbitrability of claims that might arise under sections of
the Code requiring release of control or the filing of termination statements. It also raises
questions about the effect an arbitration clause might have on the remedies stated in sec-
tion 9.625(a), which provides that, "a court may order or restrain collection, enforcement,
or disposition of collateral on appropriate terms and conditions." See TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 9.625 (Vernon 2002). If a security agreement contains an arbitration clause,
would the clause divest the court of jurisdiction to enter such orders? Is determination of
the validity of such a clause (arguably a violation of state law) to be determined by the
court or by the arbitrator under the rule of Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna? 546
U.S. 440, 446 (2006) (holding that that legality of a loan contract challenged as usurious
under state law was a matter for the arbitrator to decide). These questions and others
would be raised if arbitration clauses indeed survive full payment of a secured debt.
168. 401 B.R. 240 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2009).
169. Id. at 256. To emphasize its holding, the court used some rather unusual phrasing
in the last paragraph of the opinion, where it stated, "Fire Eagle's Senior Loan was paid in
full. As such Fire Eagle has no claim either against the SIG CD or the Guarantors under
their respective Guarantees. Fire Eagle's feigned ability to not understand the Court's




D. REPOSSESSION AND DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL
Prior to the adoption of the current version of Chapter 9, the Texas
Supreme Court had established a procedure for actions in which a se-
cured party sought recovery of a deficiency following the disposition of
collateral. In Greathouse v. Charter National Bank-Southwest, the su-
preme court announced that the creditor was required to plead that the
disposition was done in a commercially reasonable manner. 170 The
pleading could be done either specifically or generally. If done specifi-
cally, the creditor assumed the burden of proving the specific allegations;
if done generally, the creditor did not have that burden, unless the debtor
denied the commercial reasonableness of the disposition. 171 Section
9.626(a) in the present Chapter 9 states essentially the same
requirements.1 7 2
In Jantzen v. American National Bank of Texas, N.A.,173 a secured
party repossessed and sold an aircraft. In the creditor's action to recover
a deficiency, the debtor asserted that the repossession and sale were not
conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. The creditor responded
by producing a letter to the debtor showing that notice of a private sale
was given. The creditor also produced a bill of sale, along with the affida-
vit of the creditor's agent stating that the aircraft had been sold for the
price shown in the affidavit. No other evidence was provided by the cred-
itor. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that this evidence failed to ad-
dress many of the factors used in determining whether a disposition was
conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. 174 Summary judgment
in favor of the bank was reversed, and the case was remanded.175
In Sky Technologies LLC v. SAP AG, 1 7 6 the collateral consisted of sev-
eral patents. When the debtor defaulted, the secured party foreclosed on
the patents, sold them at public auction, and later transferred them to
170. 851 S.W.2d 173, 173 (Tex. 1992).
171. Id. at 176-77.
172. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.626(a)(1)-(2) (Vernon 2002). The Code pro-
vides that once the amount of a deficiency or surplus is put in issue:
(1) A secured party need not prove compliance with the provisions of this
subchapter relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance un-
less the debtor or a secondary obligor places the secured party's compliance
in issue. (2) If the secured party's compliance is placed in issue, the secured
party has the burden of establishing that the collection, enforcement, disposi-
tion, or acceptance was conducted in accordance with this subchapter.
Id.
173. 300 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no pet.).
174. Id. at 415-16. The court listed the following as typical factors to be considered in
making a determination of commercial reasonableness: (1) whether the secured party at-
tempted to achieve the best possible price, (2) whether the sale was a public or private sale,
(3) the condition of the collateral, (4) whether efforts were made to enhance the value of
the collateral, (5) how they collateral was advertised, (6) how many bids were received,
and (7) the process by which bids were solicited. See id.
175. Id. at 417. The court also reversed summary judgment in favor of the bank on a
conversion claim asserted by the debtor for the alleged loss of personal property that was
in the plane at the time of repossession, because the bank did not address issues of material
fact raised by the counterclaim. See id.
176. 576 F.3d 1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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another company. At no time after foreclosure, however, did the debtor
sign a written agreement assigning its rights in the patents to the secured
party. The transferee of the patents later sued another company for pat-
ent infringement, and that company defended by arguing the transferee
had not acquired rights in the patents because the lack of a written assign-
ment by the debtor rendered the purported transfer ineffective under the
Federal Patent Act.'77 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dis-
agreed with this contention and held that signing a security agreement
granting a security interest in the patents along with the right to dispose
of the collateral under sections 9-610 and 9-617 of the Massachusetts
Code (which is the same as the Texas Code) allowed transfer by opera-
tion of law.178 The court reasoned that transfer by operation of law is not
an "assignment" that requires a writing under the Patent Act.'79 The
court also rejected an argument that the Patent Act preempted the fore-
closure provisions of the Code, ruling instead that the transferee had
properly acquired ownership of the patents and had standing to make a
claim for their infringement. 8 0
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Code was little changed by legislation during the 2009
Survey period, case law interpretations had some significant impact. Two
cases from the federal courts stand out. The decision with the most direct
effect on the Code itself was In re Sem Crude, holding that section 9.343 of
the Code does not provide automatic perfection for oil and gas producers
for products in the hands of non-Texas debtors.181 The other decision,
with implications extending beyond the Code, was Citigroup Global Mar-
kets, Inc. v. Bacon, establishing that an appeal from an arbitration award
can no longer be based on an arbitrator's manifest disregard of the law.182
In the state courts, the Texas Supreme Court revisited the doctrine of
good faith and its interaction with open price terms in sales to retail gaso-
line dealers under section 2.305 of the Code. 83 At the producer level,
the supreme court addressed risk-of-loss issues under contract terms deal-
ing with quantity differences between natural gas produced at the well-
head and gas delivered to the buyer.18 4 Cases pending before the
supreme court that may affect the application of the Code include In re
Olshan Foundation Repair Co., LLC, holding that an arbitration clause
specifying application of the Texas General Arbitration Act can exclude
177. Id. at 1379; see 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) (requiring assignments of interests in patents
to be in writing).
178. Sky Technologies, 576 F.3d at 1380.
179. Id. at 1379, 1381.
180. Id. at 1381-82.
181. 407 B.R. 112, 130 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009).
182. 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009).
183. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Gill, 299 S.W.3d 124, 127-28 (Tex. 2009).




use of the Federal Arbitration Act, 85 and Lenk v. Guaranty Bank, deal-
ing with the liability of a bank that relied on false letters of administration
to pay funds out of a decedents' account.'8 6 Finally, a case still pending
from last year will have an impact on the application of section 9.406 and
the assignability of rights to payment when that section conflicts with
other Texas law.187
185. 277 S.W.3d 124, 132 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied).
186. No. 04-07-00503-CV, 2008 WL 2602121, at *3-4 (Tex. App.-San Antonio July 2,
2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (rule 53.7(f) motion granted).
187. See Texas Lottery Comm'n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 254 S.W.3d 677, 681-
85 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, pet. granted); Krahmer 2009, supra note 155, at 1018.
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